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India China Agreement 2013

In April 2013, India reported an invasion by the Chinese People`s Liberation Army at the mouth of the Depsang Ardennes, near the Line of Effective Control in eastern Ladakh. [10] [11] This three-week confrontation was one of the border incidents that occurred during the drafting of the agreement. [1] [12] In July 2013, India also witnessed a People`s Liberation Army movement in Chumar and transgressions in Barahoti and Dichu. [13] The agreement aims to improve communication between the two soldiers. But even after the signing of the BDCA in 2013, there were several rounds of tensions within the LAC. In September 2014, there was an impasse between the forces of the two sides after Indian workers began building a canal in a border village in Ladakh. Diplomatic interventions quickly resolved the conflict and both forces withdrew. Similarly, a confrontation between the defense forces of the two countries took place in September 2015 after Chinese troops invaded a disputed area and erected a makeshift watchtower. The Doklam crisis in 2018 also saw prolonged stalemates between troops. Despite the provisions of the agreement, there have been patrols and clashes between the armed forces. Resolving these conflicts without major collateral damage is a victory for BDCA 2013.

The most important provision of the agreement to promote peace at the border is Article VI. The article stipulates that security forces on both sides of the border may not follow or continue patrols of other parties in areas of the LAC where there is no common demarcation of the territory. The India-China Border Defense Cooperation Agreement (ADB) covers border stability and security, information asymmetry, smuggling, socio-economic reconstruction, environment and disease transmission along the line of real control. [1] [3] [4] This is a gradual addition to previous border agreements related to the Sino-Indian border dispute. [5] [6] It was expected that the agreement would include a hotline between the Chinese and Indian defense ministers, but Article IV states that this is something that „both sides can also consider,“ in addition to lower-level communication exchanges. Both sides continue to strengthen their military presence along the disputed border. Indian Premier Manmohan Singh and the Chinese Premier signed the BDCA during his visit to China in 2013. The bureaucratic leaders of the two countries produced the agreement after several rounds of rigorous closed-door meetings. At the time of its signing, the deal had drawn mixed reviews from Indian and Chinese media and the public.

The ten-article agreement lists several mechanisms to reduce misunderstandings and improve communication between the two nuclear powers along their disputed border in Kashmir. According to Reuters, „under the new agreement, both sides will announce patrols along the ill-defined border to ensure that patrols do not `continue` to reduce the likelihood of confrontation and show `maximum restraint` if the two sides face each other in areas where the line of control is unclear. If one reads the text of the article from Article VI, it becomes clear that the BDCA does little to reduce the likelihood of misperception regarding LoAC. Article VI expressly prohibits a party from actively continuing or following patrols of another site, as was the case in April. Articles VI, VII and VIII each explicitly describe dispute settlement procedures in „areas where there is no common understanding of the actual line of control“. This casts doubt on the usefulness of the 1993 agreement. During the Daulat Beg Oldi incident, China never admitted that it had entered Indian territory. With the BDCA, the Chinese could have invoked a lack of common understanding. Improving the means of communication between the two sides will reduce the likelihood of accidental intrusion, but if China decides to deliberately provoke India, it may have a stronger basis for doing so.

There have been several attempts to settle disputes and reduce the possibility of violence at these volatile borders. The two countries concluded agreements in 1993, 1996, 2005, 2012 and finally in 2013. These agreements were aimed at defining a mutually acceptable LAC, establishing consultation processes, avoiding deadlocks and prohibiting the use of weapons near the border. The 2013 Agreement on Border Defence Cooperation (BDCA) is the last of these agreements and aims to eliminate border disputes and ensure beneficial cooperation. This article discusses the objectives, provisions and failures of the 2013 BDCA Agreement, as well as its importance and the need to revive it. In July 2013, the Indian Defense Minister met with his counterpart General Chang Wanquan, as well as Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and State Councilor Yang Jiechi. In a joint statement on „peace and tranquillity in their border areas“, the two sides acknowledged „that cooperation in border management will make a significant contribution in this regard“ and „agreed on an early conclusion of negotiations on a draft agreement on border management cooperation between the two governments“. [14] Although the impact of the agreement on a final solution to the border issue is limited, it is important […].